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FOURTH-AMENDMENT ENFORCEMENT MODELS:
ANALYSIS AND PROPOSAL
BRUCE G. BERNER*
INTRODUCTION
President Reagan recently called for a new crackdown on
crime.' He listed as a major component in this drive the elimination,
by statute, of the exclusion of evidence unconstitutionally obtained.2
Thus, he joins the many detractors of the Mapp3 "exclusionary rule"
and presents a new occasion for its examination.'
The idea of protecting against unreasonable governmental
disturbances of privacy, liberty, security and property is not itself
controversial. Justice Brandeis referred to "the right to be let
alone" as "the most comprehensive . . .and the . . .most valued by
civilized men."' Fourth-amendment controversy has two sources.
First, the complex of interests protected by the fourth amendment
very often competes with the constellation of interests (also in-
cluding privacy, liberty, security and property) protected by policing
those who violate the Penal Code. It is a fact that some people use
their privacy to perpetrate or conceal crime. It is also a fact that the
government cannot, without defeating the very idea of privacy, con-
dition or monitor its use. Thus, a tension results. The fourth amend-
ment embraces this tension by providing that "unreasonable" intru-
sions by police are unlawful, that reasonable intrusions are not.'
* Associate Professor of Law, Valparaiso University.
1. N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 1981, at A28, col. 1.
2. The exclusionary rule of Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) renders inad-
missible in a criminal trial any evidence obtained by a violation of the defendant's
fourth amendment right. The case rests on an interpretation of the fourth amendment;
thus, it cannot be changed by statute, but only by the Supreme Court's renunciation of
Mapp or by constitutional amendment. The President's call for legislation is in reality
a declaration of his position and a new call to the Court, which may now have the
votes, to renounce Mapp.
3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643.
4. I would of course have written this piece anyway if the President hadn't
spoken; it just would have had a different opening paragraph. Maybe a better one.
5. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
6. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
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This is not, of course, a distinction easily made. The question "What
intrusive police conduct is unreasonable?" generates complexity,
perplexity, and continuous controversy.7 You will be delighted to
know that I will not address it.
What I do address is the second source of contro-
versy -"Assuming a violation of the fourth amendment, what is the
appropriate remedy?" The fourth amendment does not explicitly
direct the manner of its enforcement, but the Supreme Court has
stated that all constitutional guarantees implicitly call for some
means of effective enforcement Enforcement can be supplied by
legislation, common-law forms, or judicial "interpretation" of the
Constitution. Any method of enforcement is theoretically possible if
only it tends to enforce the guaranteed right.
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
7. On the one hand, the specter of central data banks, police riots, and an in-
creasing inability to shut out the outside world reinforces the complex of privacy
values. On the other, a rising crime rate, increased fear of violence, especially in urban
areas, and the impact of the media, especially television, intensify "policing" values.
Both the extensive highlighting of crime "news" and the incessant flow of sym-
pathetically drawn policemen chasing invariably guilty suspects reinforce these values.
There are not two groups in society - one representing the privacy interest
and one the policing interest. Each of us values both in varying degrees. The assign-
ment of our policing concerns to organized police enables many persons to disassociate
themselves from certain acts of oppression which may be necessary to permit the
system to run smoothly in a large, diverse population. As Paul Chevigny puts it, "The
police have become the repository of all the illiberal impulses in this liberal society;
they are under heavy fire because most of us no longer admit so readily to our illiberal
impulses as we once did." Chevigny, Police Power (1969), reprinted in Y. KAMISAR, W.
LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 144 (4th ed. 1974) [hereinafter
cited as KAMISAR]. Consider also the dual effect of a criminal trial as described by
Abraham S. Goldstein: "In addition to satisfying the public demand for retribution and
deterrence, it permits the ready identification of the same public, now in another
mood, with the plight of the aecused." The State and the Accused. Balance of Advan-
tage in Criminal Procedure, in A. GOLDSTEIN & J. GOLDSTEIN. CRIME, LAW AND SOCIETY
173, 174 (1971) (emphasis supplied) [hereinafter cited as GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN].
There is support in psychoanalytic theory for the proposition that there is, in
all of us, a tendency, seen most vividly in childhood, to "identify pleasure with the self
and unpleasure with the non-self." Thus, "(t)he impulse to divide the universe of 'good'
and 'bad' along these lines is so strong that it is only corrected slowly and with dif-
ficulty, and throughout life the tendency to project the evil in ourselves is a constant
menance to our true appreciation of reality." J. FLUGEL, MAN, MORALS AND SOCIETY 109
(1945). Thus, it is possible that a person's condemnation of police practices may be a
reaction against his own unconscious impulses.
8. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1982], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss2/1
FOURTH AMENDMENT
Many discussions about fourth-amendment enforcement in gen-
eral quickly become discussions about the exclusionary rule in par-
ticular with all the political baggage the rule carries. The rule tends
to take over the fourth amendment itself. The controversy over-
powers the notions about enforcement that we hold in common. As
this article attempts to look at the problem of fourth-amendment en-
forcement through a wide lens, the exclusionary rule, while it must
be viewed, is viewed solely as a remedy component and not in its
other guises. For example, some oppose the rule even if it has a
legitimate remedial effect." Some favor it even if it does not.'" These
arguments are relevant if the exclusionary rule is the focus of de-
bate. When, however, the question is the more general one of how
to enforce the fourth amendment, they become irrelevant."
The fourth amendment presents the legal system with two dis-
tinct questions: (1) What conduct constitutes a violation? and (2) As-
suming a violation, what is the appropriate remedy? It is important
not to confuse them." The remedy utilized to vindicate any right
will ultimately have an impact on what that right comes to embrace;
put more cynically, the term "right" may be unintelligible unless
there is some mechanism to enforce it.'3 Nevertheless, one cannot
9. See, e.g., Wilkey, The Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence?,
62 JUDICATURE 215 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Wilkey], in which the author argues
among other findings that the rule increases crime, hampers gun control and leads to
police perjury.
10. Part of the stated justification for Mapp was the idea of "judicial integri-
ty," that the courts should not, in effect, become party to the illegality by accepting
the evidence. Another way of putting it is that the state has a special obligation not to
profit from its own wrong.
11. There is, of course, nothing necessarily wrong with wanting the rule if it
does not deter or wanting to abolish it even if it marginally deters. The point is that
the arguments for those positions are extraneous to enforcing the fourth amendment.
12. A certain naivete is a condition precedent to viewing the two questions as
wholly separate. Each tugs at the other. Nevertheless, I ask the reader to share this
temporary naivete so that the remedy problem can be viewed in isolation. Until an
understanding of what problems inhere in the remedy question itself is achieved, con-
sidering extraneous influences on it is premature and unduly confusing. The physicist
who wishes to measure the gravitational pull that two apples exert on each other has
to start by understanding certain characteristics of each apple.
13. There is another dynamic to these two questions. The person deciding
whether or not there is a violation knows what remedy follows a finding of violation. If
he believes the remedy is excessive, but has no power to reduce the remedy, he may
simply "find" that there is no violation. This is especially possible in fourth-amendment
cases because there is so little general agreement on what the law is. For a good
discussion of the right-remedy dynamic in fourth-amendment cases, see Burkoff, The
Court that Devoured The Fourth Amendment. The Triumph of an Inconsistent Exclu-
sionary Doctrine, 58 OR. L. REv. 151, 186-90 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Burkoff].
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begin to fashion remedies until he conceives that certain conduct
(however loosely described) is undesired. This article is primarily
concerned with the second question: Assuming a violation, what is
the appropriate remedy? Two assumptions are, therefore, made. First,
there exists a process, either separate from the remedial process or
amalgamated with it, for determining what police conduct con-
stitutes a violation. Second, unless otherwise indicated, any police
conduct scrutinized in this article constitutes a violation (or will be
"found" to be a violation by the agency vested with such
authority)."
This article attempts to identify the necessary criteria for an ap-
propriate fourth-amendment remedy. Four enforcement models,
which currently operate or have been proposed, are evaluated in light
of these criteria and found unacceptable. Two other models which
appear to meet the necessary criteria are then proposed.
Section I identifies three critical variables- compensation of
victims, punishment of violators and deterrence of violations-exam-
ines their justifications, their relative importance, and their inter-
dependence; and suggests the criteria for an appropriate fourth-
amendment remedy expressed in terms of restricting each variable
within upper and lower limits.
Section II examines four operating or previously proposed en-
forcement models and concludes that, in each, at least one variable
is not sufficiently restricted. These models are:
Exclusionary Rule Model
By a rule of evidence, holds inadmissable, in a
criminal proceeding, any object or statement 5 obtained by
14. Terminology. The remedies spoken of herein are designed for constitu-
tional violations committed by agents of the state (usually police). Often these viola-
tions occur in the course of policing violators of the substantive criminal law. Because
of this, confusing "violators," "violations," "victims," and "enforcers" is all too easy,
and terminology should be carefully explained. If A robs B and policeman X arrests A,
A is a violator, B a victim and X an enforcer. If A now demonstrates that the arrest
violated the fourth amendment (for example, if X did not have "probable cause" for the
arrest), policeman X is a violator, A is a victim, and, depending on how the remedy is
constructed, A may also be the enforcer of X's violation. As this paper is not con-
cerned with violations of the criminal law (except as they interrelate with the constitu-
tional violation), the term "violation" is used to denote a breach of the fourth amend-
ment, "violator" the actor in such violation (usually a policeman), "victim" its object,
and "enforcer" that person authorized by the remedial model to prosecute such viola-
tion.
15. A statement is inadmissible under the fourth amendment if it is the pro-
duct of an illegal arrest or search. See Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun
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governmental agents as a product of a constitutional viola-
tion. This model currently operates in every jurisdiction."
Discipline Model
Administers employment-related penalties to the
violator through a tribunal created for this purpose. A
well-developed scheme on this model has recently been
proposed.17
Tort Model
Compensates the victim with a money award paid by
the violator in a common-law tort action, a section 1983 ac-
tion,"' or an action before a tribunal created for this pur-
pose. The common-law action has always been available in
theory.
Enterprise Liability Model
Compensates the victim with a money award paid by
the state in a common-law action, a section 1983 action, or an
action before a tribunal created for this purpose. A tribunal
on this model has been advocated by Chief Justice
Burger. 9 A proposal by Judge Jon Newman would revise
section 1983 to make the government a party defendant. 0
In his proposal of an Enterprise Liability Model, the Chief Jus-
tice recognized that abrogation of sovereign immunity is essential.2
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). This is true even if the statement was obtained
without violation of the fifth-amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
16. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, of course, was a fourteenth-amendment case
and thus applicable to all states.
17. S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUSTICE (1977) [hereinafter cited as
SCHLESINGER]. Other proposals are cited in an excellent bibliography. Id. at 109-12.
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) covers violations by state officials. It provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party
injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for
redress.
The Court has held that a victim of a federal official's fourth-amendment viola-
tion also has a cause of action. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388(1970).
19. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 422 (dissenting opin-
ion).
20. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section
1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Newman].
21. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 422-23.
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His conception of this model and the relinquishment of immunity seems,
however, inextricably linked with his well-known desire to abolish
the exclusionary rule.2 As he has stated:
Any such legislation should emphasize the interde-
pendence between the waiver of sovereign immunity and
the elimination of the judicially created exclusionary rule
so that if the legislative determination to repudiate the
exclusionary rule falls, the entire statutory scheme would
fall.23
It is difficult to perceive the source of this notion of inter-
dependence. At best, it is animated by an assumption that the two
remedies existing together would be duplicative, mutually frus-
trating, or incoherent, but no demonstration that these difficulties
would result is attempted.24
The two models put forth in section III result from an inquiry
into the sense and feasibility of combining two or more of the exist-
ing models as components in an enforcement network-the path of
inquiry so swiftly foreclosed by the Chief Justice. It will be argued
that these two models conform to the criteria postulated in section
I. These models are:
Combination Model
Compensates the victim with money paid by the state
in a tort action at common law, a section 1983 action, or an
action before a tribunal which shall be created for that pur-
pose, and administers employment-related penalties to the
violator by the tribunal. This model combines the Enter-
prise Liability Model and the Discipline Model and rejects
the Tort Model and the Exclusionary Rule Model.
Exclusion Combination Model
Retains the exclusionary rule for all but serious fel-
ony prosecutions, implements the Combination Model and
provides for linkage between the criminal courts and
those agencies involved in administering the Combination
22. The Burger Court has greatly limited the effect of the rule. See Burkoff,
supra note 13, at 4.
23. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 423 n.7 (dissenting
opinion).
24. Burger's amazing statement invites Congress to attempt to improve
fourth-amendment enforcement, but only if the inviter's own Court will trade off the
exclusionary rule. He seems to assume that too much enforcement of the fourth
amendment is a bad thing.
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Model. This model combines the Enterprise Liability
Model, the Discipline Model and the Exclusionary Rule
Model, but rejects the Tort Model.
Section IV briefly examines other dimensions of the problem.
I. THE CRITERIA FOR AN APPROPRIATE REMEDY
A. Identification of Variables
The definition herein suggested of an appropriate fourth
amendment remedy depends on the identification and interrelation-
ship of three variables. These variables-compensation, punishment,
and deterrence-are the ones most often invoked in discussion of
fourth-amendment remedies.25
By compensation, I mean those benefits (including reduction or
elimination of deprivations otherwise forthcoming) extended to a vic-
tim to approximate losses suffered and, if the remedial scheme re-
lies on the victim to invoke a process and prove the violation, to pay
for those enforcement services.
By punishment, I mean those deprivations (or withholdings of
benefits otherwise forthcoming) visited on a violator to satisfy a
retributive impulse, to express moral condemnation of the behavior,'
and to reinforce a commitment to the violated norm. Punishment
may have a deterrent effect but that is not the only reason it is im-
posed. If we were convinced, for example, that the arson statute did
not deter arson and that repealing it would not increase arson, we
would not automatically conclude that repeal is appropriate. 7 People
are punished not only so that they will not act illegally again, but
because they have so acted already.
25. "Rehabilitation" of violators is, in this setting, relatively unimportant. Cer-
tainly policemen must be educated about the law and remedies for misconduct, but any
extensive therapeutic effort seems unnecessary. If a policeman cannot be
"rehabilitated" by less ambitious efforts, dismissal from the force will, in most cases,
be more expedient.
26. Henry Hart states: "What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction
and all that distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment of community condemna-
tion which accompanies and justifies its imposition." The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958), reprinted in GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7,
at 64-65. Constitutional violations are morally condemnable as well. "Moral condemna-
tion" carries, perhaps, too much emotional baggage to have utility in describing what
happens when a judge fines someone $5.00 for "wilfull and malicious jay-walking."
Such, however, should be taken as evidence of $5.00 worth of moral condemnation.
27. This may not be as far-fetched as it sounds. The presence or absence of in-
ternal controls against arson are probably more determinative than the law's control.
19811
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By deterrence, I mean the influence that a legally authorized
threat to punish specified behavior has on anyone desiring to engage
in that behavior. In some theoretical constructs, different terms are
used to describe the effect punishment has on the future behavior of
the one punished (e.g., "special deterrence") and its influence on
others (e.g., "general deterrence" or "prevention"). 8 I shall use
"deterrence" to include both the narrower and broader influences.
B. Justification for Variables
That compensation, punishment, and deterrence are all impera-
tives of the fourth amendment is, for the most part, self-evident.
The very idea of a "right" implies that some legal adjustment must
follow its denial." And surely a society which holds civil liberties
dear must register concern, if not outrage, when these rights are
abridged. Compensation and punishment are natural responses.
28. Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 949 (1966), reprinted in GOLDSTEIN & GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at 321.
29. It may be asked why victims of fourth-amendment violations ought to be
paid if the personal "victim" of a crime is not generally paid. The answer requires
teasing some notions apart. Although a person can be the personal victim of conduct
which is a crime, he cannot be the personal victim of crime in a formal sense, for
"crime" involves a notion of an affront to society generally and to each of its members
equally. That all of us have the same stake in seeing a convict punished, and, so, being
"compensated," is what moral condemnation of the community is all about. But conduct
can amount both to a crime and a tort-indeed most crimes involve tortious activity.
The "personal victim of a crime" thus should be seen as the person with tort-plaintiff
standing arising from conduct which happens also to be a crime. The estate of a
murder "victim" has a tort action for wrongful death. The victim of a criminal assault
often, but not always, has a tort claim for civil assault. The law of torts, then, does re-
quire compensation to personal victims of crime, to be paid by the individual tort-
feasor.
Thus, a "victimless" crime (sometimes one involving a "willing victim") is really
a crime with society the victim, as always, but with no tort plaintiff, either because no
one suffered special harm ("victimless") or because such harm was consented to in
some way ("willing victim". Even as not all torts are crimes, not all crimes are torts.
There is no denying that these "personal victims" of crime, however styled, are
often left with no compensation. This is because the violator usually cannot pay. Socie-
ty (or the state) it is argued, ought to insure these risks. To some extent it does. The
legislature may vote compensation in individual cases or endow a fund for such pur-
pose. Low-level adjustment of crime often involves compensation given by the violator
to the victim. But the state also frustrates compensation to the victim by locking up
the violator or making it otherwise difficult or impossible for him to earn the money to
pay the victim. Clearly not enough is being done to compensate victims of crime, yet it
does not follow that victims of fourth-amendment violations should not be compensated
either. This- is particularly true since fourth-amendment victims receive harm at the
hands of the state, through its employees.
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Moreover, the fourth amendment guaranty is not to be "paid
for" unreasonable searches and seizures, but to be "secure from"
them. Government is thus commanded both to redress violations which
occur and to take steps to minimize their occurrence: If we visualize
a society in which police routinely break into citizens' homes and
pay handsomely for the physical and psychological damage caused,
all would be "rich" but none "secure." Deterrence is not merely an
incident of compensation and punishment, but one justification for
them.
C. Interdependence of Variables
There cannot, by definition, be any deterrence unless there is
punishment °.3 But the converse-there must be deterrence if there
is punishment-is not valid, because deterrence is measured not by
the quantity of the threat but by the quantity of the threat's in-
fluence. If the violator knows that the agency authorized to impose
punishment will not do so, his conduct is not influenced. The "gravi-
ty of the evil is discounted by its improbability. ' 3' Deterrence,
therefore, depends both on authorization of punishment and a per-
ceived likelihood that it will be employed. Punishment must be cred-
ible if it is to deter.
But before punishment can be imposed, conduct which may con-
stitute a violation must come to the attention of the punisher. Be-
cause of the limited audience for most fourth-amendment violations,
many involving only the violator and victim, any serious effort to
learn of violations must place heavy reliance on victim complaints.
This is especially true if there are strong disincentives for victims
coming forward. The typical victim of police abuse may fear retalia-
tion and have little sense of "civic duty" if such implies confidence
in those institutions which investigate, decide and remedy viola-
tions. He may fear that coming forward will prompt prosecution for
past or future conduct. What is to bring him forward if he does not
entertain some hope of receiving a benefit, especially if he is re-
quired not only to claim but to prove a violation in some adversary
process? A policeman is paid a salary for turning criminal violators
30. A policeman, of course, may be influenced to act or not by many things. I
do not mean to suggest that only the threat of punishment motivates police; rather, I
mean that the only deterrent the law can supply (other than by tapping some internal
desire to abide by it) is punishment in some form.
31. . Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951). The violator may be
deterred by a desire to abide by the law's authority or by other internal controls. The
point is that he is not deterred by punishment when he knows it will not occur.
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over to the legal system and a tort victim is promised compensation
upon proof of the tortfeasor's liability. A victim of fourth amend-
ment violations combines these roles; he has suffered a private loss,
like the tort victim and, like the policeman, he discharges a public
function-calling attention to the disregard of constitutional guar-
antees. If repayment for loss and payment for this enforcement ser-
vice are not provided, the service will not be forthcoming. Thus, if
credible compensation is not authorized, punishment cannot be im-
posed. Since no deterrence will result if punishment cannot be im-
posed, it follows that no deterrence will result if no credible compen-
sation is authorized.
Once again, however, the converse-if compensation is offered,
punishment will be imposed and some deterrence will result-does
not follow. Take, for example, the case of an illegal, but successful,
search for gambling apparatus. The evidence is excluded in the crim-
inal prosecution of the victim for possession -surely a form of com-
pensation to him which he seeks without hesitation by moving to
suppress. The policeman is not punished by that exclusion if con-
fiscation, not successful prosecution, was his sole purpose for search-
ing.2 And even if successful prosecution was his goal, how is he
punished any more than all of us, who have an interest in that pro-
secution being successful?3 Nor is he generally disciplined in such
case by the police department or superiors in the law-enforcement
apparatus, though they surely have authority to do so. Even though
a violation has been determined and the victim has been compen-
sated, the violator has not not been punished.
To summarize the dynamic of the variables: Adequate compen-
sation is necessary but not always sufficient to produce adequate
punishment; adequate punishment is necessary but not always suffi-
cient to produce deterrence.
Adequate deterrence, thus, depends on adequate compensation
and adequate punishment. Since deterrence is zero if either compen-
sation or punishment is zero, we may infer, in mathematical terms, a
product relationship-deterrence equals compensation times punish-
ment, or D = C x P.
32. Statistics showing nearly 100% success of suppression motions in a given
area over a long period of time for narcotics or gambling apparatus seizures bear the
inference that confiscation is the primary objective. See Oaks, Studying the Exclu-
sionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 684-85, (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Oaks].
33. See text accompanying note 53 infra.
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D. The Criteria
In light of the legitimacy of the variables and their in-
terdependence, an appropriate fourth-amendment remedy is defined
as one meeting the following three criteria:
Compensation Criterion
The remedy compensates the victim for losses suf-
fered and the actual cost of proving the violation plus or
minus a permissible tolerance.
Punishment Criterion
The remedy punishes the violator to the extent of
the retributive impulse plus or minus a permissible
tolerance.
Deterrence Criterion
The remedy's compensation and punishment yield, as
a product, a level of deterrence within acceptable upper
and lower limits.
Before elaborating on each criterion, several general comments
are necessary. It is conceivable that no remedy meeting these re-
quirements can be devised. If punishment and compensation are
held within defined limits, they may be incapable of yielding deter-
rence within its defined limits. If such is true, at least one criterion
must be relaxed. For example, if deterrence is too low even when
compensation and punishment are pushed to their upper limits, we
will either have to tolerate more compensation or punishment than
is reasonable for their own sakes or resign ourselves to insufficient
deterrence. There are three reasons for avoiding this problem now.
First, the permissible tolerances described for punishment and com-
pensation are specifically designed to offer a high probability of
achieving acceptable deterrence. Second, no model which has at any
time yet operated even meets the first two criteria 4 and, thus, im-
possibility is not clearly inevitable. Third, while compliance with the
compensation and punishment criteria can be verified by examining
a proposed model, compliance with the deterrence criteria is veri-
fiable only empirically after the model's implementation. For these
reasons, two models are later proposed, one making no use of the
tolerances and one pushing compensation toward its upper limit.'5
34. The Court's opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, demonstrates the
failures of all remedies in use prior to exclusion. The exclusion remedy, wholly apart
from the question of deterrent effect, punishes the policeman in no important sense.
See text accompanying note 53 infra.
35. See text accompanying notes 88-99.
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1. The Compensation Criterion
Any model which authorizes and delivers to a victim benefits
commensurate with all losses flowing from the violation and his ac-
tual expense of proving the violation, complies with the compensa-
tion criterion. If it delivers no more and no less, it is in strict com-
pliance. We shall examine several models which strictly
compensate."
A permissible tolerance is suggested since it may be desirable
to increase or decrease compensation to achieve deterrence ends.
Compensation may, for example, be increased to induce more com-
plaints when it is discerned that many violations go unreported be-
cause of barriers (including cost barriers) to invocation. Compensa-
tion exceeds the upper limit if it is disproportionately greater than
loss plus expense. When, for example, the exclusionary rule requires
suppression of critical evidence in a murder prosecution, the avoid-
ance of the conviction is an extremely high benefit to the defendant
and may bear no proportional relationship to the gravity of the
police illegality.
Compensation is too low if it does not pay the actual expense of
successful invocation of the process (or all invocations would be
economically irrational) plus some compensation for the loss of right.
We shall examine one model which does not even do this.3
7
2. The Punishment Criterion
Any model which authorizes and delivers to a violator depriva-
tions commensurate with society's retributive impulse meets this
criterion. Admittedly, it is difficult to translate a complex social-
psychological phenomenon into a program for action, but such dif-
ficulty afflicts the legal system generally and the criminal process in
particular. The attempt must be made lest interests denominated
priceless too soon become worthless.
It should be noted that the definition of punishment herein
adopted makes no reference to the future impact of its imposition on
the violator's behavior or on that of others. Rather, it is limited to
acting on the violator before us solely to adjust our present feelings
about him and his past behavior."
36. See text accompanying notes 77-99.
37. See text accompanying notes 60-68.
38. This limited definition of punishment to embrace only retribution and not
deterrence is utilized merely to stress that punishment for constitutional violations
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1982], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss2/1
FOURTH AMENDMENT
As with compensation, adequate punishment may permissibly
fluctuate within a given range. On the upper end shall be placed two
limitations, one practical and one normative. The punishment is too
high if it renders impossible the recruitment and retention of the
desired number of qualified policemen. Since this can be evaluated
only by experience, the punishing agency must be invested with
enough flexibility to reduce punishment if this occurs. On the nor-
mative side, punishment is too high if it is disproportionately
greater than that imposed in a manner strictly commensurate with
the retributive impulse. Of course this limit is quite vague but it
evokes the general contours of the problem. In addition, since the
punishment may need to be regulated to raise or lower deterrence,
a range larger than that necessary strictly to punish should be
stated.
The lower limit is breached if the punishment is dispropor-
tionately less than that imposed in strict accord with the retributive
impulse. Although this, too, produces a huge grey area, it permits at
least this standard: if a model does not punish a violator of the Con-
stitution at all, it does not meet the punishment criterion.
3. The Deterrence Criterion
Measuring how much deterrence exists, let alone deciding
whether it is "enough," is a complex operation since so many fluc-
tuating forces and counterforces co-exist with the legal sanction.
This article, however, will assume that accurate empirical evidence
of a model's deterrent effect is obtainable. Indeed, persuasive em-
pirical studies on the effect of the exclusionary rule already exist.39
should be prompted by retributive impulse alone. Some writing in this area suggests
that the only purpose for enforcing the fourth-amendment is to deter violations. Con-
sider this language of Professor Anthony Amsterdam:
The common focus on the concept of 'deterrence' in the debate over the
exclusionary rule can be quite misleading. It suggests that the police have
a God-given inclination to commit unconstitutional searches and seizures
unless they are 'deterred' from that behavior. Once this assumption is in-
dulged, it is easy enough to criticize the rule excluding unconstitutionally
obtained evidence on the ground that it 'does not apply any direct sanc-
tion to the individual officer whose illegal conduct results in the exclu-
sion,' and so cannot 'deter' him. But no one, to my knowledge, has ever
urged that the exclusionary rule is supportable on this prinicple of 'deter-
rence.'
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 431 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Amsterdam].
39. The classic piece is Oaks, note 32 supra. See also Canon, The Exclu-
sionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter Police? 62 JUDICATURE 398
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In criminal law, there are many instances in which punishment,
held within above-stated limits, produces insufficient deterrence.
For example, even when the death penalty (which many argue
breaches an ethical upper limit, but which is, in any event, the
ultimate punishment in our power) is authorized and imposed, the
murder rate often 'does not decrease. Deterrence of fourth-
amendment violations clearly can be too low.
It is, perhaps, not so clear how deterrence can be too high if
punishment limits are respected. One might say that too much
deterrence of bank robbery is unimaginable. And he would be right.
But that is not our case. It is difficult to picture human behavior
that looks like bank robbery but is not bank robbery. And even if
we could contrive an example of such bizarre behavior, there would
be no compelling reason to encourage that behavior. In contrast,
much police conduct that violates the fourth amendment is quite
similar to conduct that does not violate the fourth amendment.
Moreover, there are powerful reasons to encourage police to engage
in this "similar" conduct-arresting, searching and seizing.
If we label all the interests embraced by the fourth amendment
a "privacy complex" and all those interests comprising the need to
monitor and regulate individuals a "policing complex," these com-
plexes are polar opposites and because they are both so widely ac-
cepted as legitimate, they generate high tension. How to resolve
that tension is a central problem, but is not the focus of this article.
That problem is resolved when answering the question, "What con-
duct constitutes a violation?" and is anterior to the remedy inquiry.
We have assumed earlier that this question has been answered so
that, at any given time, it is known what police conduct is a violation
and what conduct is not. If we could arrange all possible police
behavior on a unidimensional continuum, starting at the left with
the case in which the "policing complex" most clearly outweighs the
"privacy complex" and running to the converse case on the right,
the process defining violations should, ideally, produce this picture:
Fig. 1
A lawful conduct B unlawful conduct C
(1979); Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health? Some New Data and a
Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974); Hyman, In Pursuit of a
More Workable Exclusionary Rule: A Police Officer's Perspective, 10 PAC. L.J. 33
(1974); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven That It Is a
Deterrent To Police? 62 JUDICATURE 404 (1979).
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If Figure 1 were an accurate depiction of reality, the deterrence
criterion would require that the remedy deter all conduct between B
and C and none between A and B.
But the picture does not look like this. One article surveying
fourth amendment doctrine is entitled, Search and Seizure: The
Course of True Law... Has Not... Run Smooth,'0 and the Supreme
Court has called it "nonsense" to assume that fourth amendment
law possesses "complete order and harmony."' 1 Apart from the prob-
lem of a policeman's knowledge of the law, Figure 1 is inaccurate for
three reasons: (1) the law cannot anticipate every situation in which
a policeman must decide whether or not to intrude; (2) the law does
not provide an unproblematic solution to every situation it can an-
ticipate; 2 and (3) the law's unproblematic solutions may change in
any given case and the new solution applied to such case.
For these reasons, a more accurate picture is:
Fig. 2
A B C D
lawful conduct conduct of unlawful conduct
problematic
legality
If both cases in which the law is problematic and those in which the
policeman cannot reasonably be expected to know the law are in-
cluded in the problematic category, the upper and lower limits of
the deterrence criterion are suggested. Deterrence is too low if
unlawful conduct (C to D) is consistently engaged in. Deterrence is
too high if lawful conduct (A to B) is consistently eschewed. It is
noted that the Figure 2 conception builds in tolerance automatically,
for what the policeman does in the problematic category (B to C) is
immaterial to compliance with the deterrence criterion. It may, of
course, be advisable to manipulate punishment and compensation
within their limits if substantially all problematic cases are decided
40. LAFAVE, Search and Seizure: The Course of True Law ...Has Not...
Run Smooth, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 255 [hereinafter cited as LaFave].
41. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 483 (1971).
42. One clear trend from recent Supreme Court fourth-amendment decisions
is to favor the outcome giving unambiguous directions to police in recurrent fact situa-
tions at the expense of some loss in purely intellectual rigor. See the discussion in
New York v. Belton, __ U.S. ., 101 S. Ct. 2860, 2863-65 (1981). Many writers ad-
vocate rule-making procedures to give clearer directions to police. See, e.g., Amster-
dam, note 38 supra.
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by the police in one way or the other, but the limits suggested are
minimum requirements. Several models later proposed offer a spe-
cial solution to police conduct of problematic legality.
To summarize:
A fourth-amendment remedy is in strict compliance if, and only
if:
(1) it compensates the victim by paying him the amount
of loss flowing from the violation plus his actual expenses
of proving the violation, no more, no less, and
(2) it punishes the violator in accord with the retributive
impulse, no more, no less, and
(3) it does not consistently produce unlawful intrusions
nor does it consistently chill lawful ones.
A fourth amendment remedy is in compliance if, and only if:
(1) it compensates within the limits described above
(which always require at least all actual expenses plus
some benefit for the invasion of a right), and
(2) it punishes within the limits described above (which
always require at least some punishment of the violator),
and
(3) it does not consistently produce unlawful intrusions
nor does it consistently chill lawful ones.
II. FOUR EXISTING MODELS
We will test four models, two in operation, and two which have
been recently proposed, against the compensation, punishment and
deterrence criteria.43 To aid in this endeavor, we will consider three
43. One other criterion could be stated - the extent to which the remedial
process educates police about fourth-amendment issues. One drawback of the exclu-
sionary rule is that the policeman involved often does not learn of the decision to ex-
clude or, if he does, is not told its basis. Thus, the same errors can reoccur. A model
which includes the policeman as a named party in interest promises to improve on this
situation. This is a further argument in support of the models proposed herein which
do include the policeman directly in the disciplining tribunal. While this factor's impor-
tance is not meant to be discounted, it is not elevated to the positions of compensation,
punishment and deterrence for two reasons. First, it begins to complicate the remedy
question with the substantive question of violation. Second, the question of educating
policeman is not strictly bound up in how violations are remedied. Although feedback
does not always occur under the exclusionary rule, it surely could. There is nothing in
the rule itself which bans careful explanation to the policeman of the decision and its
bases.
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hypothetical cases and attempt to project how each model would
treat (or not treat) each case.
Lucky's Case. Officer Lucky entertains a suspicion (not
amounting to probable cause though he believes it does)
that A possesses controlled substances in his apartment.
He enters A's apartment, conducts a warrantless search
in A's presence (but without his consent), finds and seizes
one gram of marijuana, arrests A and charges him with
possession. After booking, A is able to post bond and is
immediately released.
Unlucky's Case. Officer Unlucky entertains a suspicion
(not amounting to probable cause though he believes it
does) that B possesses controlled substances in his apart-
ment. He enters B's apartment, conducts a warrantless
search in B's presence (but without his consent), but finds
no evidence of any crime. B is not arrested or charged.
Cautious' Case. Officer Cautious entertains a suspicion
(not amounting to probable cause, though he believes it
does) that C possesses controlled substances in his apart-
ment. Mindful of the warrant requirement, he applies for
and receives a warrant from a magistrate who mistakenly
"finds" probable cause based on Cautious' affidavit, which
states only those facts Cautious knows to be true. Armed
with the warrant, he enters the apartment, conducts a
search within the particularity bounds lawfully set forth
in the warrant, in C's presence (but without his consent),
finds and seizes 2 kilos of heroin, arrests C and charges
him with possession. C is unable to post bond for two days
and remains in jail during that time.
It is assumed-and cases surely demonstrate"- that a violation ex-
ists in each case (though in Cautious' Case there is room for debate
on who the violator is). 5
44. Probable cause does not exist and no probable-cause exception is ap-
parent. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). In the first two
cases, failure to obtain a warrant is an independent ground for finding a violation.
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
45. It could be argued that Cautious is the violator because he searched
without probable cause. In view of the necessity for supplying incentives to police to
use the warrant procedure, it can be argued that Cautious is insulated by the
magistrate's determination. The fourth amendment, of course, also protects against
unreasonable decisions by magistrates. United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
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A. Exclusionary Rule Model
1. Description
The rule, operating in the federal courts since 19146 and in all
state courts since 1961,"7 provides that no evidence, tangible or in-
tangible, obtained as a result of an unconstitutional search or arrest
is admissible in a criminal prosecution of the victim. Its most often
stated rationale is that removal of the incentive for illegal arrests
and searches (successful prosecution for crime) will decrease viola-
tions. An ethical justification is sometimes stated as well.48 The rule
typically is invoked by the defense via pretrial motion to suppress
or at trial upon the prosecution's proffer of the tainted evidence.4"
2. Application to Hypotheticals
Lucky's Case. Lucky's luck has changed, for the marijuana is sup-
pressed upon A's motion in the criminal case. Whether the case con-
tinues depends on whether the prosecutor has enough other evi-
dence to secure conviction. (In some cases he does, but generally not
in possessory offenses.)
Unlucky's Case. As B is not prosecuted for crime, nothing happens
in Unlucky's case. Unlucky's luck has changed, too.
Cautious' Case. As in Lucky's case, the heroin is suppressed upon
C's motion in the criminal case. (Cautious may wonder now why he,
too, should not trust to luck since neither Lucky nor Unlucky has
suffered a fate worse than his.)
46. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The possibility of exclusion
had been mentioned earlier, as dictum, in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
47. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643.
48. See text accompanying notes 100-03 infra.
49. If the trial judge suppresses the evidence before trial, the prosecution in
some jurisdictions, may obtain interlocutory review. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976).
In most states, however, this is not true. KAMISAR, supra note 7, at 147. If the trial
court suppresses evidence, the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment
precludes review, assuming acquittal. See Benton v. Maryland 395 U.S. 784 (1969),
which extends this protection to state criminal defendants. If the suppression motion is
denied and the issue properly saved, the defense may obtain review on appeal follow-
ing conviction, and state convicts may obtain direct discretionary review by the
Supreme Court of the United States on certiorari. Such decisions are usually subject
to collateral attack in the jurisdiction which rendered them. KAMISAR. supra note 7, at
156-72. Until 1976, state convicts could collaterally attack their convictions in federal
courts via habeas corpus. This was virtually foreclosed by the decision in Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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3. Application to Definition
Compensation. The victim's compensation is exclusion. This leads to
two serious problems. First, if no criminal action is brought against
the victim (as in B's case), compensation is zero, breaching the lower
limit of the compensation criterion." In some cases when a prosecu-
tion is commenced, the constitutional violation may be egregious and
the objects excluded of small significance relevant to the prosecu-
tion for a minor offense. The lower limit would be breached in such
cases too. Second, there are instances in which the compensation is
so high as to violate the compensation criterion's upper limit. For
example, despite Cautious' attempt to respect C's rights, the rule
makes it impossible to convict C of a serious possessory crime, a
high compensation to C. "The criminal goes free because the con-
stable has blundered" is the slogan of abolition.'
Compensation under the rule is wildly erratic, dropping below
the lower limit in many cases and rising above the upper limit in
others. The rule compensates victims appropriately only by sheer ac-
cident (arguably, A's compensation is appropriate).2
50. This feature of the rule leads to the widespread criticism that the exclu-
sionary rule protects only the "guilty" since the "innocent" have nothing to hide and,
therefore, nothing to suppress. See Wilkey, supra note 9, at 228. This criticism
assumes that there are only two classes of persons - "guilty" persons who are
searched and "innocent" persons who are searched. Of course, there is also a third
class of persons - those who are not searched (which I think we can safely assume in-
cludes both "guilty" and "innocent" people). To the extent the rule deters, it deters
searches against the innocent as well as searches against the guilty. It is precisely by
insisting on probable cause for a search that the number of "innocent" persons search-
ed is kept down without unduly lowering the number of "guilty" persons who are
searched. Most innocent people who have "nothing to hide" seem, nevertheless, to
want their privacy.
51. The phrase was coined by Judge Cardozo (then Judge of the New York
Court of Appeals) in People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926). For
perhaps the most devastating brief tirade against the exclusionary rule, See 4
WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE, § 2184 (2d ed. 1923) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
52. One of the leading criticisms of the rule is that "compensation" ought
never take the form of relief from criminal prosecution. In Wigmore's words, the rule
does not "strike at the policeman who breaks [the Constitution], but lets off somebody
else who broke something else." See WIGMORE, note 51 supra. There is an interesting
irony to the rule pointed out by Professor Yale Kamisar, a leading fourth-amendment
scholar. Against the criticism that, without the rule, we could not punish the criminal,
he states:
If we replace the exclusionary rule with 'disciplinary punishment
and civil penalties directly against the erring officer involved,' as Judge
Wilkey proposes .. . and if these alternatives 'would certainly provide a
19811
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Punishment. In most situations, the rule simply does not punish the
violator at all. As Chief Justice Burger has stated:
The doctrine deprives the police in no real sense; except
that apprehending wrongdoers is their business, police
have no more stake in successful prosecutions than pros-
ecutors or the public.'
Of course the rule cannot punish if no criminal case is commenced.
Unlucky, therefore, receives no punishment. When a suspect is "held
for investigation" and released when his lawyer appears with a writ,
or when police troll for narcotics or gambling apparatus solely to
confiscate, no punishment results since successful prosecution is not
a police goal.
The only punishment to the policeman involved is psycho-
logical, and that only in cases of serious crime. Psychological punish-
ment can be effective, even devastating, but its impact is erratic and
may be neutralized by psychological support from colleagues or from
the public, who are entreated to recognize that the rule "ties our
hands."'" Furthermore, those policemen who feel this punishment
most intensely may deserve it the least. Cautious, who has evi-
denced some appreciation for the fourth-amendment imperative may
feel worse about exclusion than Lucky, who may view exclusion as
simply a cost of doing police business. Thus, the exclusionary rule
breaches the lower limit of the punishment criterion for in all cases
no punishment is imposed.
Deterrence. The bulk of opinion grounded in empirical studies (in-
cluding field observation) is that the rule is an insufficient
deterrent.5 These studies show a consistently high incidence of
far more effective deterrent than . . .the exclusionary rule,' as the judge
assures us .... the weapon still would not be brought in as evidence in
the case he poses because the officer would not make the search or frisk
if he lacked the requisite cause to do so.
The Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: The Struggle to Make the Fourth
Amendment More Than "An Empty Blessing," 62 JUDICATURE 337, 344 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Kamisarl. If the police honored the fourth amendment, the rule
would never be invoked and we would not constantly see the criminals who get off.
Thus, by violating the Constitution, the police build a case to destroy the rule designed
to deter violations.
53. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. at 416.
54. Interestingly, one leading argument against the rule is that it does not
work. Another is that it works too well. The exclusionary rule must be a bit like a Cor-
vair I once owned. It was a dangerous little car to drive around; fortunately, it usually
wouldn't start.
55. See note 39 supra.
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unlawful police conduct, suggesting that the lower limit of the deter-
rence criterion is being breached. If there is any validity to D = C x
P, this is not surprising, because P is close to zero.
Summary. None of the criteria is met. Nevertheless, two positive
features of the rule should be noted, especially if an inquiry into
combining models is to be made and defects in one model may be
neutralized by strengths in another. First, the rule embraces an im-
portant idea about government's special responsibility to obey the
law. 6 Second, the rule generates a continuously high volume of occa-
sions for the legal process to identify violations. 7 This is because: (1)
the victim is a criminal defendant and is compelled by self-interest
to associate with a lawyer, who will 'acquaint him with his rights and
with how to redress their violation by suppression; (2) there are no
disincentives to invoking the rule;' and (3) invocation involves little
or no marginal cost.5
B. Discipline Model
1. Description
A recent proposal on this model envisions creation of a special
tribunal to deal out fines and employment-related penalties to vio-
lators."0 Because there is little or no award to the victim to serve as
incentive for bringing such an action, its prosecution is handled by
state-paid counsel and referrals to the tribunal made by participants
in the criminal process. Methods of discipline could include: (1)
dismissal; (2) suspensions; (3) demotion; (4) delaying, or otherwise af-
fecting eligibility for promotion; (5) assignment, for a specified
period, to unattractive work detail (e.g., parking meters) or shifts; (6)
prohibition against involvement in certain work activities; (7) cen-
56. See text accompanying notes 102-03 infra.
57. A by-product of this high volume is the opportunity to establish and con-
tinuously refine answers to important fourth-amendment questions.
58. There are a few situations in which the motion to suppress conflicts with
some more important trial strategy. See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
There are not many.
59. Many criminal defendants are represented by state-paid counsel. Of those
paying their own counsel, the cost is not likely to be greater because of such motions
unless they involve especially sophisticated points. If the motion is granted, moreover,
the overall expense is apt to be much less than if the case had proceeded without the
motion.
60. SCHLESINGER, note 17 supra. As to questions of judicial review of tribunal
action and procedural due process, see Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976).
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sure or reprimand; (8) monetary fine; and (9) any combination
thereof. 1
2. Application to Hypotheticals
Lucky's Case. The marijuana is admitted at A's possession trial. If A
brings action in the tribunal or if there is a referral, the tribunal
will find a violation and impose some punishment on Lucky from the
above list.
Unlucky's Case. If B brings action, the tribunal will find a violation
and impose punishment on Unlucky.
Cautious' Case. The heroin is admitted at C's trial. If C brings action
in the tribunal or if there is a referral, the tribunal will find a viola-
tion and may impose punishment on Cautious. It is conceivable that
"acting pursuant to a warrant" would be accepted as an affirmative
defense.2
3. Application to Definition
Compensation. This model offers nothing to a victim but revenge or
vindication of a legal right. The proposal's author recommends "min-
imal, but automatic compensation to the successful claimant," 3 but
such compensation seems only payment for the enforcement service,
not for the loss of right. Clearly, this model does not meet the com-
pensation criterion.
Punishment. The Discipline Model introduces punishment which is
effective and appropriate. Whatever other preferences the typical
policeman has, he prefers to remain a policeman, to advance within
the hierarchy, and to maintain the friendship and respect of his col-
leagues. When police abuse becomes egregious, community senti-
ment should be aroused and, in some cases, criminal prosecution in-
stituted. Much police misconduct is, however, not of this ilk but is
the product of the inadequate recruitment, training and knowledge
61. Id.
62. See text accompanying note 93 infra.
63. SCHLESINGER, supra note 17, at 73.
64. Police observers often comment on the close-knittedness of policemen.
Their alienation from the community often results in the formation of a police sub-
culture, so that the dominant values of the policeman are not those of the community,
but of the police force. See, e.g., Lipset, Why Cops Hate Liberals - and Vice Versa,
THE ATLANTIC, March 1969, reprinted in KAMISAR, supra note 7, at 35, 36-37. Thus, the
punishment most meaningful to many policemen is one which affects his position or
function within the police force itself.
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of persons to whom we assign sometimes delicate or conflicting
tasks and who simply do not do their jobs properly. It is helpful to
view a violator as someone, above all, not functioning adequately at
his chosen occupation. Confusing incompetence with evil often masks
the fact that an employment problem is involved.
The punishment inflicted by the Discipline Model is flexible and
relates to the gravity of the violator's conduct, not the gravity of
the victim's conduct as under the exclusionary rule. Lucky and Un-
lucky are now treated alike based, not on the results of their intru-
sions, but, on their decisions to intrude. Whether Cautious is given a
lessor punishment or is allowed a complete defense, an important
difference between him and the other policemen is pressed into
view. Unlike the effect under the Exclusionary Rule Model, under
the Discipline Model Cautious' reliance on the warrant process is
reinforced .5
Punishment can be fashioned to fit idiosyncracies of the viola-
tor. For example, a policeman may demonstrate an inability to cope
rationally with certain crime-enforcement situations but not with
other situations. Discipline may take the form of barring him from
such work detail. Finally, the model has the capability to administer
punishment quickly, with all that that implies.
Deterrence. One would expect Lucky, Unlucky, and Cautious, and all
others who learn of their punishments, to be influenced greatly. The
problem, of course, is that the resolution of the hypotheticals, in
65. The warrant process aids in achievement of four goals. First, and most im-
portant, it interposes a neutral and detached person into the decision-making process.
As the Court, quoting Justice Jackson, has observed:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by
zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the
usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection
consists in requiring those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached
magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. . . . When the right of
privacy must reasonably yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be
decided by a judicial officer,.not by a policeman or government enforce-
ment agent.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971). Second, it memorializes, through
the affidavit process, the information known to the policeman at the time of issuance
so that facts learned later (perhaps even as a result of the intrusion) cannot be used to
justify the intrusion. Third, because of the particularity requirement of the warrant
clause, any intrusion under a warrant is carefully circumscribed as to the scope of
place and object. Fourth, the warrant process makes the actions of individual police-
men more visible to the police department. No one may ever become aware of a war-
rantless search which produces no seizure.
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each case, was conditioned by the assumption that the victim in-
stituted an action in the tribunal or that there was a referral. But
why would the victim institute an action? He receives no benefit
from it. And if he does not bring such an action, what reason is
there to assume that more self-regulation will occur than does now?
Recognizing this problem, the proposal's author calls for an in-
formal system of referrals from participants in the criminal
process." The useful possibility of linkage between the criminal
process and the tribunal is doomed in this context. The prosecutor
cannot be expected to be of much help-a healthy police-prosecution
rapport is endangered by such referrals. It is easier to anticipate
that defense counsel would refer cases, but this assumption rests on
shaky ground, for our association of the defense counsel with the
fourth amendment springs from the exclusionary rule, which is
abolished under this model. This referral proposal places the most
faith in the trial judge.
If a trial judge believed that there were evidence of il-
legal official behavior (regardless of the outcome of the
trial), he could order such a [tribunal] hearing to be held.
Under such a system, the judge must be particularly alert
during testimony to the possibility of illegal behavior by
officials, since defense counsel would not have the incen-
tive of a suppression motion to bring forward illegal
behavior. [Nor would certain lines of discovery now open
to him be available.] The judge must be given discretion
to ask questions concerning how evidence was obtained in
order to make sure that he has enough information to
recommend, where necessary, a hearing on police miscon-
duct."
This all seems otherworldly. One of the avowed purposes for
abolishing the exclusionary rule is to unclutter criminal cases of
issues which should not be there. This proposal now clutters them
with issues which are not there. What does everyone else in the
room do while the judge launches this investigation? How has he ac-
quired jurisdiction over such an issue? Will his investigation disturb
some legitimate tactic of one of the parties? Moreover, if Fuller is
right when characterizing many trial judges as "guardians of local
police morale," 8 the expectation of referrals is a dream. But the pro-
66. SCHLESINGER, note 17 supra.
67. Id at 72.
68. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 82 (1969).
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posal points out something critical to our inquiry. Existing legal
rules and institutions depend on the aggrieved party pressing his
claim to conclusion. If he does not, either because of disinterest or
the system's failure to offer enough incentive, doctrines of adver-
sariness, confrontation, jurisdiction, and the pervasive reactive style
of adjudication make it extremely difficult to overcome the complai-
nant's absence as an active participant.
There is, of course, no empirical data on this model, but if one
accepts the equation D = C x P, he would project deterrence as low
since compensation is nearly zero.
Summary. This model does not meet the compensation criterion and,
almost certainly would not comply with the deterrence criterion, but
it does strictly comply with the punishment criterion. The punish-
ment, when imposed, is appropriate and effective; because of the
absence of compensation, however, it will hardly ever be imposed. If
the compensation weakness can be eliminated through the addition
of another model, the Discipline Model would form an important
component in a remedial scheme.
C. Tort Model
We have now looked at one model which does not punish (Exclu-
sionary Rule Model) and one which does not compensate (Discipline
Model). Although these defects are sufficient to render them inap-
propriate, it was suggested also that the first has not, and the sec-
ond will not, produce adequate deterrence. A look at the traditional
possibility of a damage action by victim against violator now has a
particular allure, since a money judgment punishes the violator one
dollar for every one dollar of compensation to the victim and vice
versa.
1. Description
The Supreme Court's enunciation of the exclusionary rule
sprang largely from the abject failure of remedies of this sort. 9 The
Tort Model deserves serious attention only if its earlier defects are
eliminated. These defects defects were: (1) availability of immunity
defenses;0 (2) jury-bias against "criminals" or "suspects" and in
69. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643. A recent piece advocating a return to
tort actions for fourth-amendment violations is Gottlieb, Feedback from the Fourth
Amendment: Is the Exclusionary Rule an Albatross Around the Judicial Neck, 67 KY.
L.J. 1007 (1979).
70. For a recent treatment of the immunity problem, see Levinson, Suing
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favor of policemen; (3) inability to collect entered judgments; and (4)
largely because of the first three, inability to obtain counsel.7" Cur-
ing the problem of immunity defenses can be accomplished by legis-
lative abolition of immunity. Jury-bias is a deeper problem, but two
recent proposals offer some promise. The Chief Justice suggests a
"panel of lawyers" to decide the facts (a suggestion which has drawn
noteworthy skepticism)."2 Judge Newman, noting historically low
damages for losses of fundamental rights, suggests a legislatively
created minimum award ($1,000) 3 for a violation. The collection prob-
lem might be solved, short of holding the state liable, by mandatory
insurance coverage.
As to the problem of availability of counsel, consider these
observations of Professor Anthony Amsterdam:
Where are the lawyers going to come from to handle
these cases for the plaintiffs? Gideon v. Wainwright and
its progeny conscript them to file suppression motions;
but what on earth would possess a lawyer to file a claim
for damages before the special tribunal in an ordinary
search and seizure case? The prospect of a share in
substantial damages to be expected? The chance to earn a
reputation as a police-hating lawyer, so that he can no
longer count on straight testimony concerning the length
of skid marks in his personal injury cases? The gratitude
of his client when his filing of the claim causes the pros-
ecutor to refuse a lesser-included-offense plea or to charge
Political Subdivisions in Federal Court: From Edelman to Owen, 11 U. TOL. L. REV.
829 (1980).
71. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643.
72. Consider these remarks of Professor Amsterdam, responding to Chief
Justice Burger's suggestion:
Chief Justice Burger seems to agree with me that the traditional alter-
natives, such as criminal prosecutions and tort actions against policemen,
do not work. His faith in a special tribunal for government claims is ap-
parently based on his belief that 'lawyers serving on such a tribunal
would [not] be swayed either by undue sympathy for officers or by the
prejudice against 'criminals' that has sometimes moved lay jurors to deny
claims.' I would welcome the opportunity to put that prognostication and
my own contrary prognostication before any randomly selected group of
contingent-fee lawyers in the land by offering them a retainer as
plaintiff's counsel in the special tribunal and letting them vote with their
feet.
Amsterdam, supra note 38, at 429-30 (citations omitted).
73. Newman, supra note 20, at 465.
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priors or to pile on "cover" charges? The opportunity to
represent his client without fee in these resulting criminal
matters?7"
Some of this skepticism, of course, relates to the defects mentioned
above. Some cuts deeper. But even if most lawyers are as jaded by
the real world as Professor Amsterdam suggests, the coming of no-
fault insurance at once makes skid-mark testimony less important
and leaves many plaintiff's counsel looking around for new arenas in
which to ply their trade. If the tribunal acts fairly and the awards
are high enough, contingent-fee arrangements are possible, without
which many victims are barred at the threshold. Moreover, the
Tort Model can be constructed with state-paid "special prosecutors"
to represent claimants before the tribunal."5
Let us assume, perhaps naively, that these defects can be over-
come and test the model under our criteria, selecting a special tribu-
nal as forum, though the discussion applies equally to common-law
or § 1983 actions.
2. Application to Hypotheticals
Lucky's Case. The marijuana is admissible in A's possession trial. A
brings action against Lucky in the tribunal and collects an award.
Unlucky's Case. B sues Unlucky in the tribunal and collects an
award.
Cautious' Case. The heroin is admissible in C's possession trial. C
sues Cautious. Cautious defends on the ground that he was "acting
pursuant to warrant," The tribunal either accepts the defense and
enters no award, rejects it and enters an award, or compromises the
point by entry of a lesser award.
3. Application to Definition
Compensation, Punishment and Deterrence. If this model is to be
appropriate, the awards made by the tribunal must not transgress
the stated limits for compensation and punishment. The problem is
that the amounts of compensation appropriate for A, B, and C, and
the amounts of punishment appropriate for Lucky, Unlucky, and
Cautious do not necessarily have anything to do with each other.
The very case which produces C, the victim whose two days in jail
74. Amsterdam, supra note 38, at 430.
75. See SCHLESINGER, note 17 supra.
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following an illegal search and arrest involve the greatest compen-
sable loss, also produces Cautious, the violator (if one at all) least
deserving of punishment. Also, A, who was illegally arrested, suf-
fered a loss greater than B's (B was not arrested), but Lucky's viola-
tion was, absent his better luck, precisely the same as Unlucky's. It
is irrelevant to compensation that A and C are criminal suspects and
B is not, for that difference is fully reflected in their criminal pro-
secutions which now proceed without the exclusion possibility.
Thus, the initially alluring fact that under the Tort Model each
dollar of compensation is a dollar of punishment and vice versa has
an incurable downside-compensation and punishment are mutually
limiting. The idea, for example, of a $1,000 minimum award for a
violation plus stated minimums for each day spent in jail pursuant
to illegal arrest makes sense as compensation but would often be
disproportionate punishment of the policeman and may dangerously
jeopardize the law-enforcement effort, driving deterrence above its
upper limit. On the other hand, if awards were limited by the pun-
ishment standard, they would often be so low as to provide insuffi-
cient incentive for bringing an action. That would violate the com-
pensation criterion and would drive deterrence below its lower limit.
Nor does insurance solve this dilemma. On one hand, either the
state must pay the premium (or accept the risk to state funds) or
each policeman must. On the other, the goal is either to generate
awards measured by a punishment standard or a compensation stan-
dard. This presents four possibilities.
Fig. 3
Policeman pays premium
State pays premium (or
accepts risk)
Punishment Standard Compensation Standard
Option 1 Option 3
Option 2 Option 4
Option 1 insures that the victim will collect some award, but
will produce: (a) awards over the upper compensation limit when the
violation is egregious but the loss relatively slight (e.g., a policeman,
for no legitimate reason, stops every long-haired male pedestrian
and demands to see "some identification"); and (b) many more
awards under the lower compensation limit (e.g., Cautious' Case).
Option 2, in addition to these problems, is incoherent. If the
goal is to punish violators (or to spread punishment through the
class of potential violators), the violators must pay the premiums.
Option 3 is intriguing. The victim collects an amount appro-
priate under the compensation criterion. The traditional difficulty of
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the uncollectability of money judgments against police is overcome.
Moreover, one can imagine that an insurance company paying claims
would have, and employ, more techniques for reducing valid claims
(and therefore reducing violations) than the state does currently.
The problems with this option are, however, considerable. Since pay-
ment of awards is based on a compensation standard, the whole
class of potential violators is punished (through premium payments)
incommensurate with the amount of appropriate punishment. The
disparity between appropriate compensation and appropriate punish-
ment has not evaporated, but is only being spread among all in-
sureds. Of course, this problem appears in the area of automobile in-
surance, too-but in that area there simply is no choice but to
punish (monetarily) either the negligent driver of the car or the
class of all drivers. In our case there is a choice, and a more logical
one. The violator is an employee, and the violation is committed in
the course of employment.
This leads us to option 4-the state bears the risk and pays the
victim according to the compensation standard. But this is not a
Tort Model anymore. Why is the policeman a party-defendant? The
only possible effect of denominating him a defendant is to drive
down the award, but that is exactly what the compensation standard
tries to avoid. We now turn to option 4 under the name it was
earlier assigned.
D. Enterprise Liability Model
1. Description
This model, recognizing that law enforcement is an enterprise
which produces great risk to individual rights, visits the obligation
to pay on the entity which creates the risk-the state."6 Numerous
proposals have been made along this line,7 and an attempt is made
herein to assimilate their leading features into a scheme demon-
strating the model in its most favorable light. The following facts
are assumed: (1) sovereign immunity is abolished; (2) a special
tribunal, composed of persons least likely to be infected with any im-
permissible bias, is created to decide the violation question and
76. The word "state" is used here, and throughout, in its broadest sense to in-
clude political subdivisions and agencies of all sorts. The eleventh amendment may, in-
deed, require that the defendants in these cases be denominated as subdivisions and
not the state itself or that the state explicitly waive its eleventh-amendment right. See
Levinson, supra note 70, at 829.
77. The most significant is Chief Justice Burger's in his Bivens dissent, 403
U.S. at 411.
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grant awards payable by the state; (3) there is a minimum $1,000
award for a violation plus set minimums for common effects of viola-
tions (e.g., days in jail);"8 (4) the victim is given the option in the
tribunal of a state-paid special prosecutor (with discretion to decline
frivolous claims) or private retained counsel (who assuredly screens
frivolous claims too); (5) the victim has the option of bypassing the
tribunal and filing, instead, a common-law or § 1983 action against
the state (with his own counsel); (6) an action of the tribunal is ap-
pealable only at the discretion of the appellate court, and only as to
the violation question, and a tribunal action shall be a bar to subse-
quent filing of a common-law or § 1983 action; (7) the state is the
named party-defendant in the tribunal or in the common-law or §
1983 action.
2. Application to Hypotheticals
Lucky's Case. The marijuana is admissible in A's possession prosecu-
tion. A sues the state and receives compensation for his losses (at
least $1,000) plus expenses (there would be none in a tribunal action
with special prosecutor).
Unlucky's Case. B sues the state and receives at least $1,000 plus
expenses.
Cautious' Case. The heroin is admissible in the criminal case. C sues
the state and receives $1,000 plus the set minimum for two days in
jail plus expenses.
3. Application to Definition
Compensation. Under this model, the victim is paid in accordance
with the severity of his loss from the violation and for his expense
in proving it. If the model did not utilize state-paid prosecutors, the
cost of an attorney could, in successful action, be paid under the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976"M or some instituted
equivalent. Every victim, whether or not he is a criminal defendant,
78. There is, of course, the problem of equating money with unliquidated
losses. This is not a new problem. The idea of denominating rights as "priceless" and
then refusing damages as "speculative" often renders the right worthless. Although
Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978), held that only nominal damages could be awarded
for due process violations, a series of recent lower-court decisions has granted substan-
tial compensatory damages for violations of fundamental constitutional rights. See
Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1228 (8th Cir. 1981) and cases collected therein.
Herrera involved a fourth-amendment violation, among others.
79. Now codified as a part of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
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is eligible for this compensation. Thus, some especially obnoxious
low-visibility police misconduct may be pressed into the view of the
legal process.
Moreover, by making the state the defendant, the process is
liberated from a conception that the right to compensation depends
on identifying a particular violator deserving of punishment. For ex-
ample, the need to compensate C for the illegal search, arrest and
resulting two days in jail is evident, but punishing Cautious (or the
magistrate)" is not so clearly justifiable. But all C need show is that
some person in the law-enforcement enterprise, or the enterprise
80. One could accept the "rubber stamp" nature of the magistrate's review
and open him to sanction, or one could attempt to upgrade that decision process by for-
cing, through selection and training, the development of a more independent, proactive
posture by magistrates, in short by inculcating in them a self-image more like that of
judges. My tentative choice of the latter alternative, which includes the same kinds of
"sanction" (such as reversal) that judges are subject to, stems from a distinction be-
tween agencies charged with advocating or protecting one set of opposed values and
those charged with mediating those sets of values. The latter are more intensely
associated with the system as a whole and some collective sanction, like exclusion or
state payment of award, seems more appropriate. In addition, the policeman can, in
most circumstances, avoid exposure to sanction by applying for a warrant, thereby
shifting the decision-making responsibility, or by simply refusing to arrest or search.
We are not concerned about his doing the latter too often because his primary function
and motivation is to advance the "policing" complex. With the magistrate, however, if
we assume he is exposed to sanction for issuing a warrant, do we also assume he is ex-
posed when not issuing one which was properly applied for? If so, we visit him with a
vicious proposition-one wonders how judges would react if told they face personal
employment-related sanction for any wrong decision. If the magistrate is not exposed
to sanction for not issuing a warrant, we build in to a two-sided question a strong self-
protective bias to one side. On the other hand, this bias may be useful to compensate
for the proven bias toward issuing warrants based on a low perception of in-
dependence and a conscious or unconscious association with the whole of the law en-
forcement effort.
Any proposal for governmental liability based on respondeat superior notions
runs headlong into the Supreme Court's rejection of pure respondeat liability for
governments in cases such as Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658
(1978). Questions of what pure respondeat liability means and whether failure properly
to supervise or educate may form the basis for liability remain open. See Levinson,
supra note 70, at 841. The Monell decision is troubling in the sense that it creates an
incentive for the state to remain ignorant about the actions of employees, since the
state is liable if it does not correct obvious patterns of abuse. The proposal made
herein cuts deeper into the Monell decision. I am, in fact, arguing for pure respondeat
liability in cases where there is no fault on anyone's part. Liability is viewed as strict
given the ultrahazardousness of the policing business to fourth-amendment interests.
It has been generally recognized that for almost any alternative to the exclusionary
rule to work, sovereign immunity would have to be loosened to some extent. For the
proposals herein to work fully, the private sector respondeat superior doctrine must
be applicable against the government.
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itself, has made him a victim. Just as in private-sector respondeat
superior actions, the defendant employer first pays, and then
decides whether to visit retributive or deterrent responses on a par-
ticular agent or instead to accept the loss as a cost of doing
business.
A striking example of a violation calling for compensation but
without any obvious defendant to pay that compensation is Michigan
v. DeFillippo.8" A policeman, drawn to investigate DeFillippo by
suspicious behavior, askd for identification. DeFillippo refused and
was arrested under a Detroit ordinance making it a crime to so
refuse. The search incident to that arrest produced controlled
substances and DeFillippo was prosecuted for their possession. Even
though the Detroit ordinance was recognized as unconstitutional" (a
holding which would normally invalidate all incident searches)83 the
United States Supreme Court refused to suppress the evidence ow-
ing to the policeman's "good faith"-after all, he should be expected
to enforce the laws until they are repealed or invalidated by a
court.84 In this case, the state, through its legislative branch, caused
flagrant impairment of DeFillippo's right to be secure from govern-
mental intrusion. DeFillippo should be compensated, yet clearly the
policeman ought not be punished. There can be no wish to deter
future police conduct on the ground that some court may later
declare it illegal. If the policeman is not the violator, who is? The
legislature? The courts? As the dissenters point out:
[Tjhe Court errs, in my view, in focusing on the good faith
of the arresting officers and on whether they were enti-
tled to rely upon the validity of the Detroit ordinance. For
the dispute in this case is not between the arresting of-
ficers and respondent. The dispute is between respondent
and the State of Michigan. The ultimate issue is whether
the State gathered evidence against respondent through
unconstitutional means. Since the State is responsible for
the action of its legislative bodies as well as for the ac-
81. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
82. The Michigan courts held the ordinance unconstitutionally vague. 443 U.S.
at 34. The ordinance is also obviously and deeply in conflict with the fifth-amendment
privilege against self-incrimination.
83. If the arrest is unlawful, anything found as a result is "fruit of the
poisonous tree," Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
84. Michigan v. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. at 38-40. For a recent article on the "good-
faith" problem, see Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Reasonable"
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIM. 635 (1978).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 2 [1982], Art. 1
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol16/iss2/1
FOURTH AMENDMENT
tions of its police, the State can hardly defend against this
charge of unconstitutional conduct by arguing that the
constitutional defect was the product of legislative action
and that the police were merely executing the laws in
good faith."A
The law-enforcement enterprise is ultrahazardous to constitutional
rights. This cannot be helped. If law enforcement works at all, it will
inevitably bring injury. As with any other such enterprise, it must
bear the costs. Thus, under the Enterprise Liability Model, DeFillip-
po would be compensated, the police officer would not be punished,
and the state would pay.
The objection can be anticipated, "But if the state pays sizeable
amounts of money to victims, it will pass those losses on and 'we'
end up paying, as usual." First, techniques for punishing and deter-
ring violators should be devised to drive down those costs, and such
techniques are discussed below. This cannot be the whole answer,
for DeFillippo demonstrates that certain violations are beyond punish-
ment and deterrence. In just such cases, in which "we" end up pay-
ing again, we should pay. The Constitution "guarantees" rights only
in the sense that they cannot be taken away. It cannot pay for them.
This model compensates appropriately; it is submitted that its com-
pensation is strictly appropriate as it is geared specifically to pay
losses and the expenses of their proof.
Punishment. The Enterprise Liability Model makes no provision for
the imposition of punishment of violators. This does not, by itself,
however, prove that the model breaches the lower punishment limit
for, following the private sector analogy, the state, once it is made
to pay, may deliver punishment to maximize the success of its enter-
prise. The model need not require punishment if it is demonstrated
that the employer (the state) will naturally respond in its own in-
terest by policing its ranks.
The problem, of course, is that this particular employer is
organized in an unusual way - into three segments. Only the ex-
ecutive authority (including police departments) can "naturally"
punish these employees, but the executive authority has been made
the special guardian of the "policing complex" of values and ought
not be expected to mediate that complex's conflict with the "privacy
complex" as much as to protect its special charge. This can be seen
under current practice. The state is constantly "paying" when the
85. Michigan v. DeFillipo, 443 U.S. at 42-43.
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exclusionary rule frustrates enforcement of its criminal law; never-
theless there is very little evidence of its subsequent direct punish-
ment of violators to channel this frustration. The exclusionary rule
does not punish, but neither does the executive authority, even
though it could. The reason is that the "policing complex" is best
served by training policemen to adopt generally aggressive
behavioral patterns, and to resolve all doubts in favor of intrusion,
for such produces the highest volume of prosecutable cases, though
at a cost to the "privacy complex." Exclusion, moreover, does not
always produce a loss to legitimate law-enforcement interests, for
often a legal arrest or search was not possible to conduct under any
procedure. In this sense, it is not unlawful police work, but only
stupid police work, which damages the "policing complex" and may
result in departmental punishment.8 And if the exclusionary rule is
abolished, these behavioral patterns are even more useful to the
"policing complex" for then even violations do not prevent suc-
cessful prosecutions. None of this is to suggest that continued state
payment of awards will not jar the executive authority into re-
examining certain law-enforcement policies or into punishing
violators occasionally. It is suggested only that that authority will do
so on its own terms and wholly from the "policing complex" perspec-
tive. Certainly there will be many cases in which it will not punish
at all, even though a violator is identified.
If, then, punishment will not naturally result from executive
authority after state payment of a claim, an appropriate model must
embrace legislation or judicial action requiring punishment. This
model does not.
Deterrence. Projection of deterrent effect is difficult at best;
however, unless one thinks that loss of state funds will spur the ex-
ecutive authority to take action against many violators any more
than the exclusionary rule now does, there is no reason to believe
deterrence would be higher. 7
86. To illustrate, if a policeman has a hunch, not amounting to probable cause
(or reasonable suspicion), that the people in the car traveling in front of him are smok-
ing marijuana, it is illegal to stop them to look for it. From the "policing complex,"
however, it is not stupid since there will probably not be a later opportunity to make a
lawful search. The Supreme Court sometimes offers relief to the police for work both
illegal and stupid by holding evidence admissible if it would have been "inevitably
discovered" by lawful means. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
87. In one sense, it would be a sad commentary if the state were more con-
cerned about losing money than about enforcing its criminal law.
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III. Two PROPOSED MODELS
The previous section demonstrated that only one existing
model - the Tort Model - both compensates and punishes. But
that model ties compensation and punishment together in one opera-
tion which leads to inappropriate lowering of one or elevation of the
other. What is needed is a model which compensates and punishes in
separate operations under separate standards. The first proposal in
this section combines the Enterprise Liability Model (which strictly
compensates) with the Discipline Model (which strictly punishes).
A. Combination Model
1. Description
The exclusionary rule and sovereign immunity are abolished
and a tribunal is created (1) to decide whether or not there is a
violation upon complaint of an alleged victim and, if so, (2) to enter a
monetary award against the state-defendant as outlined in the
Enterprise Liability Model, and (3) to decide if there are any iden-
tifiable individual violators, and (4) to punish violators as outlined in
the Discipline Model. Victims may, at their option, by-pass the
tribunal and bring a common-law, or § 1983 action against the state.
If the state suffers a judgment in such case, however, the matter
shall be automatically referred to the tribunal for purposes of (3)
and (4). The tribunal must accept as res judicata any judgment that
a violation has occurred, but such a judgment does not automatically
imply punishment, for it may be that no individual violator can be
identified (as in DeFillippo) or that the policeman identified has a
defense to discipline. Representation of the victim before the
tribunal could be provided by private retained counsel or by state-
paid special prosecutor.8 For purposes of discussion, the latter is
assumed. 9
2. Application to Hypotheticals
Lucky's Case. The marijuana is admissible in A's criminal pro-
secution. A institutes action in the tribunal which enters a $1,000
88. See SCHLESINGER, note 17 supra.
89. One other possible feature, given that common-law and § 1983 actions are
not foreclosed, is the setting of a maximum recovery in the tribunal of say, $5,000.
Such a limit may help foster a more informal process. You may be tempted to say my
figure is too high or too low; any really careful thought will, however, show you I am
right.
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award in A's favor and against the state and, (by assumption) since
this is Lucky's first violation, reprimands Lucky and enters a nota-
tion in his permanent file.9"
Unlucky's Case. B chooses (by assumption) to sue the state via §
1983. A judgment is entered in his favor. The matter is automatical-
ly referred to the tribunal. It decides that Unlucky is the violator of
B's rights and, since (by assumption) this is Unlucky's third viola-
tion, suspends him without pay for two weeks.
Cautious' Case. The heroin is admissible in C's prosecution. He
brings action against the state in the tribunal and receives $1,000
plus the set minimum for two days in jail. Cautious interposes the
defense of "acting pursuant to warrant."'" The tribunal either ac-
cepts such defense or enters the minimum punishment.
3. Application to Definition
Compensation, Punishment and Deterrence. This model assimilates
the compensation characteristic of the Enterprise Liability Model
and the punishment characteristic of the Discipline Model. The com-
pensation acts not only to make victims whole but to create occa-
sions to identify violations and administer appropriate discipline to
violators. Unlike the Tort Model, however, while every violation
brings compensation, it does not necessarily bring punishment, for
some injury is the result of an enterprise ultra-hazardous to con-
stitutional rights. The compensation can be high and the punishment
low or vice versa for they are not tied together as in other models.
A number of possible affirmative defenses to discipline are sug-
gested to demonstrate the sorts of situations which might generate
compensation but not punishment. (1) The policeman acted pursuant
to a warrant, did not include in the underlying affidavit any known
false or "recklessly believed" facts,2 and remained within its scope."'
90. I certainly do not mean to suggest this punishment is necessarily the cor-
rect amount. Here, as in other examples, I have included an actual punishment simply
to add concreteness to the hypothetical.
91. See text accompanying note 93 infra.
92. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). See also Schlicter, The Out-
wardly Sufficient Search Warrant Affidavit: What If It's False?, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
96 (1971).
93. The warrant must be "particular" with reference both to the place to be
searched and the person or thing to be seized. LaFave, supra note 40 at 267 n.79 and
268 n.91. It must be executed within a specified period of time. See, e.g., Fed. R. Crim.
P. 41(d). Nighttime searches may depend on certain prerequisites. See MODEL CODE OF
PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, § 220.1 (Proposed Official Draft No. 1, 1972). Knock-and-
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The appropriateness of such defense is debatable, and seems to turn
on whether one views the obtaining of a warrant as a ratification of
the affiant's decision or as a complete shift of that decision. Permit-
ting the defense yields encouragement for a wider use of warrants. 4
(This defense is applicable to Cautious' case.) (2) The policeman acted
under specific superior orders. If this defense is accepted in a given
case, the special prosecutor should be charged with instituting ac-
tion in the tribunal against such superiors.95 (3) The policeman's con-
duct was, at the time engaged in, not reasonably know to be
unlawful. This defense includes both conduct thought lawful at the
time (DeFillippo) and conduct of problematic legality. The defense
would permit the widest scope to law-enforcement within current
legal boundaries, generate occasions to clarify the law and compen-
sate victims in such cases without punishing the individual
policeman. This is the paradigmatic case in which the monetary loss
should be spread among all of us who entertain these inherently con-
flicting value complexes.
Deterrence is, again, difficult to predict. However, this model
does threaten a mode of punishment which is credible to policemen
and the compensation incentive offers hope of numerous occasions to
consider its imposition.
This model strictly punishes, strictly compensates and offers
credible promise of complying with the deterrence criterion as well.
B. Exclusion-Combination Model
It might seem superfluous, having once identified a model in
strict compliance with the criteria, to propose yet another model
which is not in strict compliance. However, binding tolerances into
each component of the definition, in addition to responding to certain
realities about their internal dynamic, was prompted by a notion
that if one first excluded all those models which did not meet basic
functional goals, he would then be free to apply other criteria to
those which remained. Even so, a remedy not in strict compliance
ought to bear some burden to overcome a model which is in strict com-
pliance. It is not claimed that this next model meets that burden but
announce requirements must be complied with. Sabbath v. United States, 391 U.S. 585
(1968); Ker v. California 374 U.S. 23 (1963); Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958).
94. See note 65 supra.
95. Obviously, this defense must be constructed delicately; giving a complete
defense to clearly illegal conduct based on superior orders involves serious ethical dif-
ficulties.
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only that it complies with the criteria and offers certain advantages
over the Combination Model.
1. Description
This model adds the Exclusionary Rule Model to the Combina-
tion Model. Because the rule often produces compensation in excess
of the upper limit when applied in prosecutions for serious crime,
such application is denied under this model - the exlusionary rule
is made unavailable in prosecutions for serious offenses." Surely dif-
ficult problems are raised by so gross a distinction; nevertheless, for
present purposes, the designation "serious crime" is used. 7
The tribunal would receive cases in one of three ways: (1) by
direct complaint of the victim; (2) by automatic referral from a
common-law or § 1983 court after a finding of violation and entry of
monetary award against the state; and (3) by automatic referral
from the criminal court after exclusion of evidence (or quashing of
arrest) on fourth-amendment grounds. In situations (2) and (3), the
tribunal must accept as res judicata the prior decision that a viola-
tion has occurred.
The victim in a case referred by a common law or § 1983 court
would be denied further compensation in the tribunal (which would,
therefore, consider only the punishment question), since he has
already received compensation in a forum with the authority to
decide what his actual loss was and the flexibility to award an
amount commensurate with that loss. It is not clear in the case of a
referral from a criminal court, however, that the victim has, as yet,
received compensation commensurate with his loss. Exclusion may
represent more or less than compensation so measured. If it is more,
the model does not correct that deficiency; instead, while compensa-
tion is more than loss, the model will seldom, if ever, (because of the
"serious crime" exception) be over the upper limit, and such de-
viance is the price for the model's other gains. If exclusion represents
too little compensation, the tribunal could cure that by awarding the
96. Some thought might be given to excluding all possessory offenses from
the "serious crime" definition since such cases often involve police misconduct and a
strong deterrent may be necessary. Some method must be devised, also, to deal with
the fact that the crime charged may be within the definition of serious crime while cer-
tain includable offenses are not within that definition.
97. Actually, the "serious-crime" exception would not change many results.
Although the rule's detractors paint the rule as loosing murderers and robbers, this is
very seldom true. Vice and narcotics are the common contexts. See Kamisar, supra
note 52, at 341.
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victim the difference. Such a theory, however, betrays heroic con-
fidence in the tribunal's ability to make fine distinctions about
values difficult to liquidate in the first place. Therefore, it is pro-
posed that exclusion be deemed equal to the specified minimum
award ($1,000, using an earlier assumption). The victim would be en-
titled to further compensation only for "special" losses, such as days
in jail, physical or psychological injury or property damage.
If the criminal court decided, by denying a motion to suppress
or quash, that no violation occurred, this decision too would be res
judicata. There would be no referral and any direct action in the
tribunal would be precluded. Moreover, failure to move for suppres-
sion at the last permissible point under pertinent procedural rules
would act as a bar to direct complaint in the tribunal. If, however,
the criminal case is terminated by dismissal or guilty plea before
such time without any decision on the violation question, the victim
may file a direct complaint.9
2. Application to Hypotheticals
Lucky's Case. The marijuana is suppressed upon A's motion in the
criminal case. The matter is automatically referred to the tribunal.
Victim A (thinking he has no provable "special" damage and not be-
ing entitled to the automatic $1,000 since he has received the benefit
of supression) may not actively participate, but the special pro-
secutor is, of course, charged with seeking discipline. The tribunal
must accept the decision that a violation occurred. Therefore, the
discipline aspect is in the nature of a show-cause hearing in which
Lucky is invited to urge his affirmative defenses or mitigating
proof. The tribunal decides A has no "special" damage and thus
enters no award. Since (by assumption) this is Lucky's first violation
he is reprimanded and notation of the violation is made in his per-
manent file.
Unlucky's Case. B brings a direct complaint in the tribunal. (Notice
that since there is no prosecution of B, he must trigger the tribunal
process). The tribunal finds a violation and no affirmative defense to
98. See note 78 supra.
99. If a motion to suppress is decided and then the case is terminated by guilty
plea or dismissal, the question arises whether to accept such finding as res judicata
notwithstanding the inability to challenge it by appeal. Since, however, appeal of such
issue is not available after dismissal or plea, it would seem that such decision should
be accorded the weight of a "final" judgment. As to current law on the res judicata im-
plications of a suppression decision on a § 1983 action and other similar issues, see
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) and cases cited therein.
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discipline and awards B $1,000 and since (by assumption) this is
Unlucky's third violation, suspends him for two weeks.
Cautious' Case. The progress of this case depends on whether
possession of two kilos of heroin comes within the "serious crime"
definition adopted in the jurisdiction.
a. Serious Crime.
The heroin is admissible. C files action in the
tribunal, which finds a violation and awards C $1,000 plus
the set minimum for two days in jail. If the tribunal ac-
cepts Cautious' "acting pursuant to a warrant" defense, he
is not punished. If the defense is not accepted, he is given
a minor punishment.
b. Not a Serious Crime
The heroin is excluded upon C's motion and the mat-
ter referred to the tribunal. The tribunal accepts (as it
must) the finding of violation and awards C the set
minimum for two days in jail (the $1,000 minimum being
deemed satisfied by the exclusion). The punishment aspect
is handled as in the first alternative.
3. Application of Definition
Compensation. Compensation cannot be too low under this model.
Whether it may be too high in some cases is debatable. I would
argue that it cannot be too high since there is a violation of constitu-
tional right and the highest compensation for such is either suppres-
sion in a prosecution for a non-serious crime or an award of $1,000.
More violations will be addressed under this model than under
the Combination Model. The Combination Model depends entirely on
victim initiation of the process as a plaintiff. This model permits
some (perhaps most) victims to initiate the process as a defendant in
the criminal process. There is less inertia against raising matters by
way of defense than by way of claim. Although the victim who is
prosecuted for crime comes into contact with an attorney who will
apprise him of his remedies under either model, such advice is not
strictly relevant under the Combination Model and, because it is not
an issue in the criminal case, discovery lines are not open to in-
vestigate violations.
Punishment. The mode and amount of punishment, when imposed,
remains the same as under the Combination Model. Because of the
automatic referral provision however, punishment will be imposed in
more cases.
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Deterrence. As compensation and punishment are both increased
over the last model, deterrence can be expected to increase too.
Because of the availability of affirmative defenses to discipline, and
especially the defense of problematic legality, it does not appear
that the model will deter in excess of the upper limit, for lawful or
problematic intrusions need not be eschewed.
IV. OTHER DIMENSIONS
Both proposed models meet the stated criteria; others, perhaps
with entirely different features, could be constructed within the
criteria too. Choosing from among such models may depend in part
on their relative approximation to "strict" compliance, but depend
even more on other factors having nothing to do with punishment,
compensation, and deterrence."'
One possible explanation for the seeming intractability of the
fourth-amendment enforcement problem is a tacit assumption that
one type of remedy, whatever it is, should be sufficient. One goal of
this article is to suggest that there are too many variables to the
problem to admit of solution by one rule, one type of lawsuit, or one
statute. To focus either on compensation alone or punishment alone
blurs the other factor. When either is blurred, deterrent effect is
disturbed. A system which focuses on each of these variables in
turn, free from the influence of the other, is needed. The two pro-
posed models are attempts along those lines.
Implementing either of the proposed models requires a political
process. This, by itself, argues for setting broad limits to each
variable so as to give tolerance for the hard realities of that process.
Each model requires legislation for implementation and each, to
some degree, depends on judicial renunciation of the exclusionary
rule. But the Exclusion-Combination Model could coexist with the
rule in full force. If the "serious crime" exception were struck down,
the model should be permitted to operate nevertheless. It will then,
of course, produce cases in excess of the upper compensation limit,
but it will represent gains in compensation, punishment, and deter-
rence over the rule operating alone. We will have no better model
than the political process provides, but there is no compelling reason
to construct barriers to accepting the best that process can offer.
There is an ethical, or philosophical, dimension !to the fourth-
amendment remedy question, and especially to the place of the ex-
100. These would include ethical and philosophical points as well as political
realities.
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clusionary rule in any enforcement scheme. Opponents of the rule
have never argued against compensation, punishment, or deterrence;
rather they claim that the state's authority to punish criminal of-
fenders ought never be affected by its employee's violations. They
have only claimed that the "criminal should not go free," not that
the constable should go free, nor that the "criminal" should not be
viewed as a victim too and compensated in some way other than ex-
clusion.1 ' And the rule's proponents, too, invoke ethical considera-
tions. One, so grandly stated by Justice Bandeis, places a special
obligation on government to obey the law, to be "the potent, the om-
nipresent teacher." ' Another proponent speaks of "judicial integri-
ty," claiming that no court should, even by indirection, become party
to governmental lawlessness.0 3
This article does not enter that political or philosophical debate
but attempts to give it a limiting context. Until a remedy is con-
structed which, within generous limits, compensates victims,
punishes violators and aspires to minimize violations, speeches
about "criminals going free," "omnipresent teachers" and "judicial
integrity" are without a common referent, are ships passing in the
night. They may be good debates on the exclusionary rule, but they
have forgotten that there is a fourth amendment to be enforced.
If government does not compensate, punish, and attempt to
deter, one may understandably wonder what this rehetoric can
possibly be all about. Why should a government that does not do
even this have integrity? And why should it have the power to
brand others criminal? If government is indeed "the potent, the om-
nipresent teacher," it ought now take another hard look at the
fourth-amendment curriculum.
101. I am aware of no published argument that the exclusionary rule be
abolished and nothing put in its place.
102. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
Professor Charles Black recently characterized "law" as "the Government's omnipre-
sent teaching assistant." DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 51 (1981).
103. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. at 659.
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